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Abstract
In this paper, we consider each of the nine principles of BDI logics as deﬁned by
Rao and Georgeﬀ based on Bratman’s asymmetry thesis, and we verify which ones
are satisﬁed by Rao’s AgentSpeak(L), a computable logic language inspired by the
BDI architecture for cognitive agents. This is in line with Rao’s original motivation
for deﬁning AgentSpeak(L): to bridge the gap between the theory and practice of
BDI agent systems. In order to set the grounds for the proof, we ﬁrst introduce
a particular way in which to deﬁne the informational, motivational, and delibera-
tive modalities of BDI logics for AgentSpeak(L) agents, according to its structural
operational semantics (that we introduced in a recent paper). This provides a frame-
work that can be used to investigate further properties of AgentSpeak(L) agents,
contributing towards giving ﬁrm theoretical grounds for BDI agent programming.
1 Introduction
Since Shoham’s paper on agent-oriented programming [15], many agent pro-
gramming languages have been proposed, following various approaches. Con-
Golog [3] is a concurrent programming language based on the situation calcu-
lus, Concurrent MetateM [5] is based on temporal logics, andMINERVA
[9] is based on dynamic logic programming. AgentSpeak(L) [12] is based on
1 Currently at the Department of Computer Science, University of Liverpool, U.K. Email:
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the BDI (Beliefs-Desires-Intentions) architecture [13] and the more practical
experience with PRS [6] and dMARS [8]. Other BDI programming languages
were derived from AgentSpeak(L), such as 3APL [7], improving it in some
ways (e.g., in handling plan failure).
The BDI architecture now permeates a signiﬁcant part of research in
multi-agent systems. This is an important aspect to consider when work-
ing on agent-oriented programming languages. We have chosen to work with
AgentSpeak(L) and to extend it in various ways; the extended language is
called AgentSpeak(XL) [1]. The choice of AgentSpeak(L) is based on its very
neat and elegant notation, and because we ﬁnd it to be more faithful, so to
speak, to the BDI architecture than other BDI-inspired programming lan-
guages.
In [12], not only has Rao introduced the operation of an abstract interpreter
for AgentSpeak(L), but he also sketched a proof theory for that language in
which, he claimed, known properties that are satisﬁed by certain BDI logics
could also be proved. Further, he claimed that there is a one-to-one corre-
spondence between his interpreter and the proof system. This was, in fact,
his proposal for bridging the gap between BDI theory and practice. However,
those claims were never proved, to the best of our knowledge. Examples of
properties that Rao mentioned as being satisﬁed by certain BDI logics are the
ones known as the asymmetry thesis principles [14].
This paper contributes towards a more formal grounding for BDI program-
ming in that it shows which of the asymmetry thesis principles are satisﬁed
by any agent programmed in AgentSpeak(L). In order to do so, we ﬁrst need
to formally deﬁne what the three mental attitudes expressible in BDI logics
mean for AgentSpeak(L) agents. These deﬁnitions are based on the structural
operational semantics that we have given to AgentSpeak(L) in [11]. This
in fact constitutes a framework in which to prove other BDI properties of
AgentSpeak(L). Recent publication has appeared in which there is also an in-
terest in properties of BDI agent languages. Winikoﬀ et al. [18], for example,
give formal semantics to a language which has some properties integrating
declarative and procedural views of goals; this can be used in reasoning about
goals for detecting and resolving conﬂicts among them.
The recent popularity of the multi-agent approach to the construction
of complex computational systems is remarkable. However, agent-oriented
programming languages still need much theoretical work on which to base the
practice of the multi-agent systems community: this is the main motivation
of this paper, the remainder of which is as follows. The next section gives
the necessary background on AgentSpeak(L) and on the asymmetry thesis
principles. Section 3 presents the framework with which we prove, in Section 4,
the asymmetry thesis principles for AgentSpeak(L).
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2 Background
2.1 AgentSpeak(L)
After Rao introduced AgentSpeak(L) in [12], further formalisation of the ab-
stract interpreter and missing details was given by d’Inverno and Luck in
[4]. Their formalisation was done using the Z formal speciﬁcation language.
As we mentioned before, in [11], we gave a structural operational seman-
tics for it. However, until recently there was no available implementation
of an AgentSpeak(L) interpreter. In [10], we have shown the means for
running AgentSpeak(L) programs within Sloman’s SIM AGENT framework
[17]. That was the ﬁrst prototype implementation of an AgentSpeak(L) in-
terpreter, and we have called it SIM Speak. A mechanism is provided in
SIM Speak for the conversion of AgentSpeak(L) programs into running code
within SIM AGENT. In [1], we proposed some extensions to AgentSpeak(L).
For this extended language called AgentSpeak(XL), we have implemented from
scratch an eﬃcient interpreter in C++, which should be available soon.
We now cover the basics of the syntax and informal semantics of
AgentSpeak(L) (further details can be found in Appendix A and in the ref-
erences given above). An AgentSpeak(L) agent is created basically by the
speciﬁcation of a set of base beliefs and a set of plans. Base beliefs are ground
atoms in the usual form (e.g., busy(line)). The set of beliefs (which change dy-
namically) represents the information an agent presently has about the world
(i.e., its environment). A plan can be considered as a sequence of steps (a
course of action) the agent needs to execute in order to handle some perceived
event, as seen later.
AgentSpeak(L) distinguishes two types of goals: achievement goals and
test goals. Both are predicates as deﬁned for beliefs but the former are pre-
ﬁxed with the ‘!’ operator, while the latter are preﬁxed with the ‘?’ operator.
Achievement goals are used when the agent needs to achieve a certain state of
the world by performing actions and possibly achieving other (sub)goals (e.g.,
!book(tickets)). Test goals are used when the agent needs to test whether
the associated predicate is a true belief, i.e., whether it can be uniﬁed with
the agent’s belief base, thus binding free variables in the body of plans (e.g.,
?busy(X)). (As in Prolog, variables are denoted with an uppercase initial
letter.)
Next, the notion of triggering event is introduced. It is a very important
concept in AgentSpeak(L), as it is the triggering event that speciﬁes what
type of event can start oﬀ the execution of a plan. There are two types
of triggering events: those related to the addition (‘+’) and those related
to the deletion (‘−’) of mental attitudes, speciﬁcally beliefs and goals (e.g.,
−busy(line), +!book(X)).
An AgentSpeak(L) agent uses plans to deﬁne possible courses of action.
Therefore, plans have to refer to the basic actions that an agent is able to
perform on its environment. In detail, an AgentSpeak(L) plan has a head
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which is composed of a triggering event (the purpose of that plan), and a
conjunction of belief literals forming a context that needs to be satisﬁed if
the plan is to be executed (the context must be a logical consequence of
that agent’s belief base at the moment the plan becomes intended). A plan
also has a body, which is a sequence of basic actions or goals that the agent
has to achieve (or test). An example plan is +concert(X,Y ) : like(X) ∧
¬busy(line)<-call(Y ); . . . ; !book(tickets).
The AgentSpeak(L) interpreter also manages a set of events and a set of
intentions, and its functioning requires three selection functions. The event
selection function (SE) selects a single event from the set of events; another
selection function (SAp) selects an “option” (i.e., applicable plan) from a set
of applicable plans; and a third selection function (SI) selects one particular
intention from the set of intentions.
The selection functions are supposed to be agent-speciﬁc, in the sense that
they should make selections based on an agent’s characteristics (though pre-
vious work on AgentSpeak(L) did not elaborate on how designers specify such
functions). Therefore, we here leave the selection functions undeﬁned, hence
the choices made by them are supposed to be non-deterministic. Our exten-
sion to AgentSpeak(L) in [1] deals precisely with the automatic generation
of eﬃcient intention selection functions. The extended language allows one
to express relations between plans, as well as quantitative criteria for their
execution. We then use decision-theoretic task scheduling to guide the choices
made by the intention selection function.
Intentions are particular courses of actions to which an agent has commit-
ted in order to handle certain events. Each intention is a stack of partially
instantiated plans. Events, which may start oﬀ the execution of plans, can be
external, when originating from perception of the agent’s environment (i.e.,
addition and deletion of beliefs based on perception are external events); or
internal, when generated from the agent’s own execution of a plan (e.g., a
subgoal in a plan is an addition of goal which may be a triggering event). In
the latter case, the event is accompanied with the intention which generated it
(as the plan chosen for that event will be pushed on top of that intention). Ex-
ternal events create new intentions, representing separate focuses of attention
for the agent’s acting on the environment.
We next give some more details on the functioning of an AgentSpeak(L)
interpreter. At every interpretation cycle of an agent program, AgentSpeak(L)
updates a list of events, which may be generated from perception of the envi-
ronment, or from the execution of intentions (when subgoals are speciﬁed in
the body of plan). It is assumed that beliefs are updated from perception and
whenever there are changes in the agent’s beliefs, this implies the insertion
of an event in the set of events. This belief revision function is not part of
the AgentSpeak(L) interpreter, but rather a necessary component of the agent
architecture.
After SE has selected an event, AgentSpeak(L) has to unify that event
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with triggering events in the heads of plans. This generates a set of all relevant
plans. When unifying the context part of heads of plans in that set with the
agent’s base beliefs, AgentSpeak(L) determines a set of applicable plans (plans
that can actually be used for handling the chosen event). Then SAp chooses a
single applicable plan from that set (the intended means to handle that event),
and either pushes that plan on the top of an existing intention (if the event
was an internal one), or creates a new intention in the set of intentions (if the
event was external, i.e., generated from perception of the environment). Each
of an agent’s intentions is, therefore, a stack of partially instantiated plans.
All that remains to be done at this stage is to select a single intention to
be executed in that cycle. The SI function selects one of the agent’s intention
(i.e., one of the independent stacks of partially instantiated plans within the
set of intentions). On the top of that intention there is a plan, and the formula
in the beginning of its body is taken for execution. This implies that either a
basic action is performed by the agent on its environment, an internal event
is generated (in case the subgoal is an achievement goal), or a test goal is
performed (which means that the set of beliefs has to be checked).
If the intention is to perform a basic action or a test goal, the set of
intention needs to be updated. In the case of test goals, further variable
instantiation will occur in the partially instantiated plan which contained that
test goal (and the test goal itself is removed from the intention from which it
was taken). In the case where a basic action is selected, the necessary updating
of the set of intentions is simply to remove that action from the intention (the
interpreter informs to the architecture component responsible for the agent
eﬀectors what action is required). When a removed formula marks the end of
the body of a subplan, the subgoal that generated it (which therefore stays
in the beginning of the body of the plan immediately below it in the stack) is
also removed from the intention, or the whole intention is removed from the
set if the initial plan (i.e., the plan triggered by an external event, hence in
the bottom of an intention) is the one that ﬁnished execution. This ends a
cycle of execution, and AgentSpeak(L) starts all over again, checking the state
of the environment after agents have acted upon it, generating the relevant
events, and so forth.
The abstract syntax and operational semantics of AgentSpeak(L) we gave
in [11] is reproduced in a very compact way in Appendix A. Some familiarity
with that material is necessary for understanding the framework and proofs
in the next sections.
2.2 Asymmetry Thesis Principles
According to Rao and Georgeﬀ [14], Bratman’s Asymmetry Thesis [2] basically
says two things:
• it is irrational for an agent to intend to do an action and also believe that
it will not do it (intention-belief inconsistency);
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• it is rational for an agent to intend to do an action but not believe that it
will do it (intention-belief incompleteness).
To these, Rao and Georgeﬀ add the idea that:
• it is rational for an agent to believe that it can do an action without neces-
sarily intending it (belief-intention incompleteness).
These were formulated by Rao and Georgeﬀ in [14] as principles AT1–AT3,
which are shown in Table 1. They also formulate principles for the other two
combinations of pairs of mental attitudes (intention-desire and desire-belief).
Table 1 shows all nine asymmetry thesis principles.
Label Principle
AT1 |= INTEND(ϕ)⇒ ¬BEL(¬ϕ)
AT2 |= INTEND(ϕ)⇒ BEL(ϕ)
AT3 |= BEL(ϕ)⇒ INTEND(ϕ)
AT4 |= INTEND(ϕ)⇒ ¬DES(¬ϕ)
AT5 |= INTEND(ϕ)⇒ DES(ϕ)
AT6 |= DES(ϕ)⇒ INTEND(ϕ)
AT7 |= DES(ϕ)⇒ ¬BEL(¬ϕ)
AT8 |= DES(ϕ)⇒ BEL(ϕ)
AT9 |= BEL(ϕ)⇒ DES(ϕ)
Table 1
Asymmetry Thesis Principles [14].
In [14], the INTEND modality if deﬁned over state formulæ, which means
that the notion here is that of intention-that (a certain state of the environ-
ment is achieved) rather than intention-to (do an action which will lead the
environment to reach a certain desired state). Therefore, it may be unclear to
the reader whether the BDI formulæ in Table 1 actually capture Bratman’s
ideas on the asymmetry thesis (in particular in regards to intentions and be-
liefs on doing an action). It is not in the scope of this paper to discuss that:
we are interested here in showing how to prove BDI properties in a practical
programming language, and those nine principles certainly express interest-
ing properties of BDI agents (whether or not they capture exactly Bratman’s
asymmetry thesis).
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3 A Framework for Proving BDI Properties in
AgentSpeak(L)
In order to prove which of the asymmetry thesis principles apply to
AgentSpeak(L), we ﬁrst need to be able to express the three B-D-I compo-
nents of BDI logics for AgentSpeak(L) agents. In Appendix A, we reproduce
in a very compact way the syntax and structural operational semantics of
AgentSpeak(L) agents, as given in [11]. We use below the deﬁnitions given
in the appendix for an agent ag , which is in fact a sequence of beliefs and a
sequence of plans (“ag ::= bs ps” in the syntactic rules), and the deﬁnition
of the circumstance of an agent. An agent circumstance C is deﬁned there
as a tuple 〈I, E,A,R,Ap, ι, ρ, ε〉, of which are relevant here only the set of
intentions I, set of events 3 E, and the set of actions 4 A. An agent and its
circumstance form a conﬁguration of the transition system giving operational
semantics to AgentSpeak(L). We use the notation CI to refer to the I compo-
nent of C, and similarly for the other components. We use i, i′, . . . to denote
intentions and i[p] denotes the intention that has plan p on top if i.
Based on the parts of an agent and agent circumstance mentioned above,
we shall be able to introduce deﬁnitions for the three mental attitudes ex-
pressible in BDI logics (BEL(ϕ), DES(ϕ), and INTEND(ϕ)). Here, formulæ
ϕ, over which the three modalities are deﬁned, are simply atoms, similarly to
“at” in the AgentSpeak(L) syntax (in the appendix), except that variables are
allowed. Ground atoms are the only formulæ that can appear in an agent’s
belief base and external events, only in the case of internal events they may
not be ground atoms; these are the AgentSpeak(L) structures from which the
mental attitudes are ascribed, as the deﬁnitions in this section will show. We
need to formalise what the three BDI modalities mean for an AgentSpeak(L)
agent at a certain circumstance. We start with the belief modality, which is
quite straightforward.
Deﬁnition 3.1 [Belief in AgentSpeak(L) agents] We say that an
AgentSpeak(L) agent believes a formula ϕ iﬀ it is included in the agent’s
belief base; that is, for an agent 〈bs , ps〉 (regardless of any circumstance C):
BEL(ϕ) ≡ ϕ ∈ bs .
3 When the belief revision function, which is not part of the AgentSpeak(L) interpreter but
rather of the general architecture of the agent, updates the belief base, the associated events
are included in this set. That is, changes in beliefs from perception of the environment are
represented as external events which are included in this set, as well as internal ones. Note
that this means an interaction of the AgentSpeak(L) interpreter with other parts of the
(assumed) overall agent architecture: the belief revision function inserts events here which
are actually dealt with by the AgentSpeak(L) interpreter.
4 As for events, this provides an interaction of the AgentSpeak(L) interpreter with other
parts of the overall agent architecture (in this case, with the agent’s eﬀectors). An action
expression included in this set tells other architecture components to actually perform the
respective action on the environment, thus changing it.
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This needs no further explanation, as an agent’s beliefs are explicitly repre-
sented within an AgentSpeak(L) interpreter. Intentions are also rather explicit
in the architecture, but the same does not apply for desires. That is why we
introduce the intention modality before desire (and also because we shall need
this deﬁnition for deﬁning desire).
We ﬁrst deﬁne an auxiliary function agoals : I → P(Φ), where I is the
domain of all individual intentions and Φ is the domain of all atomic formulæ
(as mentioned above). Recall that an intention is a stack of partially instan-
tiated plans so, following the syntactic deﬁnition of plans ps in the appendix,
if p ∈ ps is a plan then p ∈ I; if i ∈ I then also i[p] ∈ I. In words, the agoals
function takes an intention and returns all achievement goals in the triggering
event part of the plans in it. If i is T, the true (or empty) intention, then
agoals(i) = {}. For any i ∈ I and p ∈ ps :
agoals(i[p]) =


{at} ∪ agoals(i) if p = +!at : ct<-h
agoals(i) otherwise.
If we were following Rao’s original deﬁnition of the semantics of
AgentSpeak(L), we would not need to worry about triggering events other
than addition of achievement goals in the deﬁnition above. In an intention
(following the original deﬁnition), a triggering event that is not an achievement
goal appears only in the plan that is at its bottom. External events create
new focuses of attention that the agent needs to consider; in other words, a
new intention is created for them. Only the execution of achievement goals
(from the body of a plan) causes the addition of internal events which, when
selected, change an intention. In particular, what these events do is to push
a (partially instantiated) plan on top of an existing intention. Therefore, all
the triggering events in a stack of plans (one of the intentions in I) are ad-
ditions of achievement goals, except the one at the very bottom, which is a
change of belief (from perception). However, in the semantics we provide in
Appendix A, we have extended the deﬁnition of plans to allow changes in
beliefs to be made by an executing plan. Handling plan failure also makes
it possible to ﬁnd deletion of achievement goals in an intention, but this is
not in the semantics given here, although it is implemented in the interpreter
presented in [1].
Intentions are suspended when they are waiting for an appropriate subplan
to be chosen (in the form of an internal event, which is an event associated
with an existing intention); suspended intentions are clearly formalised in [4].
Suspended intentions are, therefore, precisely those that appear in the set of
events CE at a circumstance C. That is, suppose that an achievement goal
appears in the beginning of a plan body, and that plan is on top of an intention
that was chosen to execute (by the intention selection function). Before that
intention is selected again for execution, the related event need be chosen from
CE and a relevant and applicable plan (an intended means) must be found for
it. If that happens, the intended means will be pushed on top of that stack and
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only then the (previously suspended) intention goes back to CI , becoming a
candidate for execution again (see rules Achieve and IntEv in the appendix).
The format of events is 〈te, i〉, where te is a triggering event (see appendix
for details) and i ∈ I is the intention that generated it (i is T for external
events). Accordingly, an AgentSpeak(L) agent’s intentions, at circumstance
C, are either the current intentions in CI , or the suspended ones that appear
in the events in CE.
Deﬁnition 3.2 [Intention in AgentSpeak(L) agents] An AgentSpeak(L) agent
intends ϕ at circumstance C iﬀ it has ϕ as an achievement goal that currently
appears in its set of intentions I, or ϕ is an achievement goal that appears
in the (suspended) intentions associated with events in E. For an agent’s
circumstance C, we have:
INTEND(ϕ) ≡ ϕ ∈
⋃
i∈CI
agoals(i) ∨ ϕ ∈
⋃
〈te,i〉∈CE
agoals(i).
Although this is not mentioned in the original literature on AgentSpeak(L),
it is our impression that desires in an AgentSpeak(L) agent are best repre-
sented by its set of events. Internal events are achievement goals 5 , which are
clearly desires: traditionally, goals are a subset of desires which are assumed
to be mutually consistent [16]; in the simpliﬁed version of the architecture
used for AgentSpeak(L), consistency of goals is taken for granted—see [18] for
a discussion on goal conﬂicts. It is therefore our interpretation that events
in CE that have the form of additions of achievement goals are desires (i.e.,
they have not yet been selected to become intended, but represent states that
the agent wishes to achieve); achievement goals that are already intended are
desires too, but this is explained below. External events in CE, on the other
hand, represent the agent’s reactions to (believed) changes in the environment
and therefore not a desire but rather a source of motivation for desires (goals).
Recall that external events are expressed as changes in beliefs; they are the
consequence of belief revision based on perception of the environment. Ex-
ternal events, in turn, cause a series of internal events: these we consider the
agent’s desires (not their external cause, which represents a focus of attention).
However, when an internal event is selected (and removed from the set E
of events) in an attempt to ﬁnd relevant and applicable plans for it, and one
of them becomes an intended means to handle that event, that does not imply
that the agent no longer desires to handle that event. A possible interpretation
is that it only ceases to be a desire once the execution of the plan associated
with it in the set of intentions ﬁnishes execution. In fact, it is a common
interpretation that intentions are a subset of the agent’s desires (when one is
considering intention-that rather than intention-to, of course). Thus, besides
the achievement goals in E we also consider as desires of the agent all of its
intentions. It is important to emphasise that with this choice of interpretation
5 Again, in our semantics, because of the extension to allow belief changes in plans, internal
events may be addition and deletion of beliefs too, but not in the original semantics.
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for what desire means in an AgentSpeak(L) agent, we are determining which
of the asymmetry thesis principles AT4, AT5, and AT6 (which relate desires
and intentions) will be satisﬁed by AgentSpeak(L) agents. However, we think
this is the most reasonable interpretation, as intentions are normally seen as
those desires the agent has committed to act so as to achieve them (hence
intentions are indeed a subset of desires).
Deﬁnition 3.3 [Desire in AgentSpeak(L) agents] An agent at circumstance
C desires a formula ϕ iﬀ ϕ is an achievement goal in C’s set of events E
(associated with any intention i), or ϕ is a current intention of the agent;
more formally:
DES(ϕ) ≡ 〈+!ϕ, i〉 ∈ CE ∨ INTEND(ϕ).
Having deﬁned how to interpret the belief, desire, and intention modalities
of BDI logics for AgentSpeak(L), we are ready to start proving which of the
asymmetry thesis principles are satisﬁed by AgentSpeak(L) agents.
4 Proof of the Asymmetry Thesis Principles for
AgentSpeak(L)
We start by presenting three lemmas, each concerning the Asymmetry The-
sis Principles (ATP) that refer to the relations between the BDI attitudes
taken pairwise. The argumentation on the three principles AT1–AT3 (relat-
ing beliefs and desires) requires some discussion on the practice and style of
programming with AgentSpeak(L). If AgentSpeak(L) programmers call a cer-
tain achievement goal !ϕ, then it is good programming style that they expect
ϕ to be believed by the agent (through perception of the environment) if all
goes well with the execution of any plan chosen to handle that event. How-
ever, even in case the whole system (including any simulated environment)
was engineered taking that into account, there is always the question that
environments are non-deterministic. Therefore, there can be no way to assure
that it will be the case that ϕ will be in an agent’s belief base after the plan for
+!ϕ ﬁnishes execution. In fact, this argumentation is intended to show that
in the recommended programming style, ϕ will not be normally true when an
event having +!ϕ is generated but rather after a plan for it ﬁnishes execution,
and even then ϕ will not be necessarily believed (this will be considered in the
proof of the ﬁrst lemma below). Having or not ϕ as a belief when intending
!ϕ can only be assured, however, if the programmer explicitly includes such
restriction in the context part of the plans to handle that event.
Another aspect, which is relevant when considering each of the three pairs
of BDI attitudes is the closed world assumption 6 , well known in Prolog,
6 Interestingly, d’Inverno and Luck [4] allow AgentSpeak(L) agents to have complex beliefs
(but on the other hand leave it unspeciﬁed how to check whether a plan context is a logical
consequence of the belief base). However, in its original deﬁnition, Rao [12] stated that
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but also present in AgentSpeak(L). This means that, for an agent 〈bs , ps〉,
if ϕ ∈ bs , then BEL(¬ϕ) holds. In consequence, whenever in the ATP
we have, e.g., ¬BEL(¬ϕ), then we know it is the case that BEL(ϕ). Ac-
cordingly, in light of the closed world assumption, we can restate AT1 as
|= INTEND(ϕ) ⇒ BEL(ϕ), AT4 as |= INTEND(ϕ) ⇒ DES(ϕ), and AT7
as |= DES(ϕ) ⇒ BEL(ϕ). Thus, principles AT1, AT4, and AT7 cannot be
proved alongside AT2, AT5, and AT8 for AgentSpeak(L) (or any other logic
programming language using the closed world assumption, for that matter).
Also, recall that an agent may have its belief base completely changed by
belief revision from perception. The belief revision function is not part of
the semantics of AgentSpeak(L), but rather a component of the general agent
architecture in which an AgentSpeak(L) interpreter is inserted. Again, as the
environment is non-deterministic, nothing can be assured as to what will be
believed by the agent after pursuing a desired or intended state of the world.
Lemma 4.1 (Intention-Belief Principles in AgentSpeak(L)) Agents
programmed in AgentSpeak(L) do not satisfy AT1, but satisfy AT2 and AT3.
Proof. Considering that, at any given time, an AgentSpeak(L) agent 〈bs , ps〉
may have its set of beliefs bs changed by its belief revision function (which is an
extra-logic process here, as it is not part of the semantics of AgentSpeak(L)),
we cannot assure that BEL(ϕ) (see Deﬁnition 3.1) is true when INTEND(ϕ).
Thus AT1 is not satisﬁed by AgentSpeak(L) agents and, accordingly, AT2 is
satisﬁed.
Principle AT3, in turn, is also satisﬁed by AgentSpeak(L) agents. The
formula BEL(ϕ) ⇒ INTEND(ϕ) could only be valid if programmers were
required to include plans in an agent’s plan library for all possible additions
of belief +ϕ, and that those plans had in their bodies an achievement goal
!ϕ. Of course that is not the case (which would be unreasonable from the
practical programming point of view). Therefore, BEL(ϕ) ⇒ INTEND(ϕ) is
not valid, hence AT3 is satisﬁed. ✷
Lemma 4.2 (Intention-Desire Principles in AgentSpeak(L)) Agents
programmed in AgentSpeak(L) satisfy AT4, do not satisfy AT5, and satisfy
AT6.
Proof. Referring to Deﬁnition 3.3, we see that DES(ϕ) is deﬁned by a dis-
junction of which INTEND(ϕ) is one of the disjuncts. It is easy to see that
|= INTEND(ϕ)⇒ DES(ϕ), which is the closed-world version of AT4. There-
fore, AgentSpeak(L) agents satisfy AT4 and, of course, do not satisfy AT5.
The AT6 principle is satisﬁed by AgentSpeak(L) agents because, given
an AgentSpeak(L) agent’s belief base had solely ground belief atoms. This means that
closed world was intrinsically assumed. Rao was quite concerned in providing a computable
language for the BDI architecture which was actually practical. In that respect he succeeded,
even if closed world assumption turns out to be inappropriate for agent programming. In this
initial work on proving the ATP, we have maintained the original deﬁnition for simplicity.
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an agent’s circumstance C, there can be an event 〈+!ϕ, i〉 ∈ CE such that
DES(ϕ) holds, but rule Appl2 (see appendix), which is used when there are no
applicable plans, may always apply whenever 〈+!ϕ, i〉 ∈ CE is selected by SE
(see rule SelEv), thus INTEND(ϕ) may never holds, while DES(ϕ) continues
to hold. A formula INTEND(ϕ) can only be true after Appl1 applies, so that
ϕ ∈ agoals(i) for some i ∈ CI or possibly later on 〈te, i〉 ∈ CE (i is a suspended
intention in the latter case): recall that these are the conditions under which
INTEND(ϕ) hold, according to Deﬁnition 3.2. Therefore, as it cannot be
guaranteed that Appl1 will eventually apply, INTEND(ϕ) may never hold
even though DES(ϕ) does. ✷
Informally, satisfying AT6 represents the fact that an AgentSpeak(L)
agent’s desire may never have an applicable plan which would allow it to
satisfy that desire (ﬁnding such plan makes the desire to become intended).
Notice that, in the semantics in the appendix, we have formalised the idea
that if a chosen event does not have an applicable plan when it is selected, it
is included again in the set of events in the hope that latter on, when selected
again, it may possible to handle it (see how C ′E changes in Appl2). Another
possibility is to simply discard the event (neither alternative is actually ideal,
but this has not been discussed in the AgentSpeak(L) literature). The latter
possibility does not change the satisﬁability of AT6 either (INTEND(ϕ) does
not apply whilst DES(ϕ) does, even if it applies only shortly before being
selected and discarded).
Lemma 4.3 (Desire-Belief Principles in AgentSpeak(L)) Agents pro-
grammed in AgentSpeak(L) do not satisfy AT7, but satisﬁes AT8 and AT9.
Proof. Similarly to the proof of Lemma 4.1. ✷
Theorem 4.4 (Asymmetry Thesis Principles in AgentSpeak(L))
All AgentSpeak(L) agents satisfy the asymmetry thesis princi-
ples AT2, AT3, AT4, AT6, AT8, and AT9, but do not satisfy
AT1, AT5, and AT7.
Proof. Follows immediately from Lemmas 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3. ✷
Corollary 4.5 (Equivalence to BDI Logics) In regard to the ATP that
are satisﬁed, AgentSpeak(L) is not equivalent to either BDI-B1, BDI-B2, BDI-
S3, BDI-R3, or BDI-W3, as deﬁned in [14].
Proof. Rao and Georgeﬀ proved that those logics satisfy other combinations
of ATP; refer to [14] for details. ✷
Note that Rao and Georgeﬀ only analyse the logics BDI-B1, BDI-B2, BDI-
S3, BDI-R3, and BDI-W3 with respect to the ATP. It remains to investigate
the other logics in the family of BDI logics they present in that paper to check
whether any of them satisfy the same ATP as AgentSpeak(L). This would be
interesting in the process of deﬁning a logic which is semantically equivalent
to AgentSpeak(L).
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5 Conclusion
This paper contributes towards giving theoretical support for the implemen-
tation and veriﬁcation of multi-agent systems. It introduced a framework
for proving BDI properties of agent-oriented programming languages. This
framework was then used to prove the ATP for AgentSpeak(L). The particu-
lar combination of ATP satisﬁed by AgentSpeak(L) agents does not coincide
with the ones satisﬁed by some of the BDI logics according to [14]. Future
work includes both proving other BDI properties that may be satisﬁed by
AgentSpeak(L), as well as trying to match AgentSpeak(L) with a particular
BDI logic in terms of the BDI properties they both satisfy. This may be a
ﬁrst step towards describing AgentSpeak(L) as a logic, which would be useful
for proving properties of (implemented) intelligent agents.
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A Syntax and Semantics
of AgentSpeak(L)
This is the syntax and semantics of
AgentSpeak(L) as given in [11]. It
is here presented in a very compact
way; refer to that paper for a com-
mented presentation. To allow for a
more compact presentation, provisos
on the inference rules are shown be-
low them, preceded by ‘’.
Syntax
• AgentSpeak(L) Agent
ag ::= bs ps
bs ::= b1 . . . bn (n ≥ 0)
ps ::= p1 . . . pn (n ≥ 1)
• Beliefs
at ::= P(t1, . . . , tn) (n ≥ 0)
where P is a predicate symbol;
a belief is an atom with no variable
(we use b for beliefs)
• Plans
p ::= te : ct<-h
te triggering event
ct context
h sequence of actions, goals, and
belief updates (a plan’s body)
• Context
ct ::= at | ¬at | ct ∧ ct | T
• Actions, Goals, Belief Updating,
Plan Body
a ranges over basic actions
g ::= !at | ?at
u ::= +b | −b
h ::= a | g | u | h;h
· !at is an achievement goal
· ?at is a test goal
• The ﬁrst component in the head of a plan
is a triggering event :
te ::= +at | − at | + g | − g
• If p is a plan of the form te : ct<-h, we
deﬁne TrEv(p) = te and Ctxt(p) = ct ,
which retrieve the triggering event and
the context of the plan, respectively.
• AgentSpeak(L) Selection Functions:
SE : event selection function
SAp : applicable plan sel. function
SI : intention selection function
Semantics
• The semantic rules below deﬁne a tran-
sition relation
〈C, agent〉 −→ 〈C ′, agent ′〉
• an agent’s circumstance is a tuple
C = 〈I, E,A,R,Ap, ι, ρ, ε〉
· I set of intentions,
· E set of events,
· A set of actions to be performed in the
environment,
· R set of relevant plans,
· Ap set of applicable plans,
· ι intention being considered,
· ρ plan being considered,
· ε event being considered.
• set of relevant plans RelPlans(ps, te) =
{pθ | p ∈ ps ∧ θ = mgu(te,TrEv(p))}
• applicable plans AppPlans(bs, R) =
{pθ | p ∈ R ∧ θ is s.t. bs |= Ctxt(p)θ}
• performing a test goal results in a set of
substitutions:
Test(bs, at) = {θ | bs |= atθ}
• Notation
· CE denotes component E of C, and
similarly for the others;
· Cι = indicates that there is
no intention being considered in the
agent’s execution, and similarly for Cρ
and C;
· i[p] denotes the intention that has
plan p on top of i.
Rules
Event Selection
SelEv
SE(CE) = 〈te, i〉
C, ag −→ C ′, ag
 Cε = , CAp = CR = {}
where: C ′E = CE − 〈te, i〉
C ′ε = 〈te, i〉
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Relevant Plans (1)
Rel1
RelPlans(ps, te) = {}
C, ag −→ C ′, ag
 Cε = 〈te, i〉 CAp, CR = {}
where: C ′R = RelPlans(ps, te)
Relevant Plans (2)
Rel2
RelPlans(ps, te) = {}
C, ag −→ C ′, ag
 Cε = 〈te, i〉 CAp, CR = {}
where: C ′ε =
Applicable Plans (1)
Appl1
AppPlans(bs, CR) = {}
C, ag −→ C ′, ag
 Cε = , CAp = {}, CR = {}
where: C ′R = {}
C ′Ap = AppPlans(bs, CR)
Applicable Plans (2)
Appl2
AppPlans(bs, CR) = {}
C, ag −→ C ′, ag
 Cε = , CAp = {}, CR = {}
where: C ′R = {}, C ′ε =
C ′E = CE ∪ 〈te, i〉
Selection of Applicable Plan
SelAppl
SAp(CAp) = p
C, ag −→ C ′, ag
 Cε = CAp = {}
where: C ′ρ = p, C
′
Ap = {}
Preparing the Set of Intentions (1)
ExtEv
C, ag −→ C ′, ag
 Cε = 〈te,T〉, Cρ = p
where: C ′I = CI ∪ { [p] }
C ′ε = C
′
ρ =
Preparing the Set of Intentions (2)
IntEv
C, ag −→ C ′, ag
 Cε = 〈te, i〉, Cρ = p
where: C ′I = CI ∪ { i[p] }
C ′ε = C
′
ρ =
Selection of an Intention
SelInt
SI(CI) = i
C, ag −→ C ′, ag
 Cι =
where: C ′ι = i
Basic Actions
Action
C, ag −→ C ′, ag
 Cι = i[head <- a;h]
where: C ′ι =
C ′A = CA ∪ {a}
C ′I = (CI − {Cι})∪
{i[head <- h]}
Achievement Goals
Achieve
C, ag −→ C ′, ag
 Cι = i[head <- !at;h]
where: C ′ι =
C ′E = CE ∪ {〈+!at , Cι〉}
C ′I = CI − {Cι}
Updating Beliefs (1)
AddBel
C, ag −→ C ′, ag ′
 Cι = i[head <- + b;h]
where: C ′ι =
bs ′ |= b
C ′E = CE ∪ {〈+b, Cι〉}
C ′I = (CI − {Cι})∪
{i[head <- h]}
Updating Beliefs (2)
DelBel
C, ag −→ C ′, ag ′
 Cι = i[head <- − b;h]
where: C ′ι =
bs ′ |= b
C ′E = CE ∪ {〈−b, Cι〉}
C ′I = (CI − {Cι})∪
{i[head <- h]}
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Test Goals (1)
Test1
Test(bs, at) = {}
C, ag −→ C ′, ag
 Cι = i[head <- ?at;h]
where: C ′ι =
C ′I = (CI − {Cι})∪
{i[head <- h]}
Test Goals (2)
Test2
Test(bs, at) = {}
C, ag −→ C ′, ag
 Cι = i[head <- ?at;h]
where: C ′ι =
C ′I = (CI − {Cι})∪
{i[(head <- h)θ]}
θ ∈ Test(bs, at)
Removing Intentions (1)
ClrInt1
C, ag −→ C ′, ag
 Cι = [head <-]
where: C ′ι =
C ′I = CI − {Cι}
Removing Intentions (2)
ClrInt2
C, ag −→ C ′, ag
 Cι = i′[head ′<- !at ;h′][head <-]
where: C′ι =
C ′I = (CI − {Cι})∪
{i′[head ′ <- h′]}
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